Abstract. Making secure a software system is a very critical purpose, especially because it is very hard to consolidate an exhaustive body of knowledge about security risks and related countermeasures. To define a technological infrastructure for exploiting this knowledge poses many challenges. This paper introduces a system to capture, share and reuse software security knowledge within a Software Organization. The system collects knowledge in the form of misuse cases and makes use of Case Based Reasoning for implementing knowledge management processes. A reasoned analysis of the system was performed throughout a case study, in order to identify weaknesses and opportunities of improvement.
Introduction
Knowledge about software security is now acquiring an economic and strategic value for Organizations: recently a market of vulnerabilities is developing and expanding fast [4] . In order to improve security into software products, developing or hiring skilled professionals is not enough [11] . As pointed out by Barnum and McGraw [13] , critical software security knowledge should be captured and widely shared. Once formalized and catalogued, this knowledge could be used within the Organization with two purposes: training, and supporting the problem solving process. Previous experience could be reused as is, or could help produce the solution for a new problem. Threats modeling is a central aspect of the security engineering process [5] . A way to model threats in terms of interaction with the system is the misuse case [9] . A misuse case describes potential system behaviors that are not acceptable by a system's stakeholders. A misuse case defines a sequence of steps which lead the user to misuse the system, i.e. to violate privacy or security policies. These misuses either represent high-probability attacks or high-impact events that negatively affect the system's legitimate stakeholders. Misuse cases should be at a level of detail that drives design activities, and they are convenient means for capturing knowledge about system's security. A misuse case could leverage a security flaw at three different levels of detail:
-domain level, i.e. when the user process allows illegal access to sensitive resources; for instance, when web pages that should be accessed with https protocol could be reached with a http connection, too; -design level, i.e. when the design exposes security bugs; an example is the sql injection vulnerability; Once the new problem is described (new case), the engine searches for similar problems stored into the base (retrieve phase) by calculating the similarity of the new case with the previous cases. Two cases are similar when they correspond to similar problems. Similarity functions are divided in two classes: the surface similarity, that expresses the distance between two cases by a number into a range [0,1] or [0,100]; and the structural similarity, that considers cases as complex structures, as well as graphs: similarity is a function which compares the properties of these structures into the two cases. The retrieved case which has the highest value of similarity is the candidate for solving the new problem (reuse phase). Three classes of reuse exist: (i) replacing parts of the solutions, namely substitution; (ii) altering part of the structure, namely transformation; and finally (iii) applying the derivation of the (old problem's) solution to the new problem, namely generative adaptation. The proposed solution to the new problem, i.e. the new case is then validated (revise phase). Finally the new case must be integrated in the case base (retain phase).
With this paper we adapt the CBR mechanisms for capturing, sharing, and reusing knowledge about security threats within a Software Organization. We focused on the models applied to the retrieve phase. The structure of the case refers to the specifications of misuse case provided by Sindre et al. [7] , which are detailed in the table 1, while a complete case is provided in table 8 (missing attributes are empty in the case).
The user will define the case in natural language, but special literal values must be used when the case is filled in. Such values are named domain's tag. These values will be the elements of the corresponding attribute's domain. As a matter of fact, each attribute is defined upon a finite and discrete domain, which should increase over time. This happens because when the number of cases in the knowledge base gets bigger, the need of a greater expressiveness to describe misuse cases arises. For instance, in the example in table 8 the tags for the attribute preconditions are publicly available and registered as a customer.
Let O t arget be the searched object in the case base; it describes the problem that the user needs to solve. O t arget is a partially filled in case. As some attributes do not help the retrieve phase, the candidate attributes to be compiled in the O t arget are: triggers, preconditions, assumptions, related business rules, stakeholder and threats, potential misuser profile, scope, abstraction level, and precision level. O t arget is a matrix where each row represents an attribute of the misuse cases, and each column is a value assumed by the attribute, i.e. a key for the search of similar cases. An exemplar O t arget is shown in table 2.
The system will search the most similar cases in the knowledge base. In order to establish whether two cases are similar, a similarity measure must be defined. The similarity between two objects is a function, called Global Similarity and defined in the interval [0:1], where 1 corresponds to the maximum similarity. A similarity measure fulfills these properties: reflexivity, symmetry, monotony, and triangle equality. Let Oa 1 , a 2 , , a n be a complex object with n attributes a i , while let (O 1 ,O 2 ) be two instances of the O α . First, the similarity between the correspondent couple of values for each attribute a i of (O 1 ,O 2 ) should be calculated, namely local similarity (localSim i ). Thus, the global similarity is calculated by including the local similarities for all the n attributes of the object.
LocalSim i . The way of local similarity calculation depends on the kind of objects' attribute. In case of: numbers, similarity is a distance; strings, similarity is an evaluated comparison; symbols, similarity is calculated for each possible combination; object, similarity is measured by a proper function which considers all the object's fields. The soundness of a similarity measure is expressed through the gold standard. This is a set of comparisons with a desired similarity value, defined by the user or a domain expert. A key point of estimating the quality of a similarity measure will always be the calculation of its deviation to the gold standard. This basically consists of two steps: choosing pairs of objects to compare and choosing a meaningful measure for calculating the deviation. Some algorithms have been proposed in order to accomplish the first step; as this is not the focus of this paper, this argument will be not discussed here. We used the formula:
where n is the number of comparisons, goldStd i is the gold standard value and simValuei is the calculated value for the i-th comparison. Further methods includes the root mean square error and the threshold error, which will not be treated here. Finally the fitness function [16] , which is a hyperbolic function must be defined as
-deviation max , as the max measure of diversity, and varies between 1 and 100; -fitness mean , measures the quality of the comparison; -fitness max , measures the maximum of similarity.
These can be used to adapt the hyperbola to the concrete needs one might have, transforming a deviation to a fitness. These might be that a defined maximal deviation leads to a fitness value of 0 and that a deviation of 0 leads to a defined maximal fitness value(or infinity if a is chosen to be 0).
So if one defines two points which the hyperbola has to cross, namely, fitness(0) = fitness max and fitness(deviation max ) = 0, it is possible to set up two equations for the parameters (a, b and z) of the common hyperbola. So a third point of the hyperbola is needed (i.e., can be chosen) to set up the third equation. Having these three points it is possible to calculate the three parameter values. Let's define a value fitness mean , that corresponds to the fitness function's value for the deviation of deviation max /2. Choosing this value to be fitness max /2, the resulting function would be a straight line.
The similarity function consists of a collection of similarity tables, one for each attribute of the case. The similarity table defines the similarity between all the possible couples of that attribute's values. Let α= a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , a 4 
In summary, the CBR Retrieve phase process is recalled: first, the user defines the target object to search, i.e., by instantiating the matrix O target .The system calculates the global similarity for each candidate case (O retr j ) in the knowledge base, namely and GlobalSim (O target , O retr j ) . The system selects the O retr j which is able to maximize the fitness function.
The user can exploit a retrieved case O retrieved in order to solve the new problem. There are three situations. O retrieved fits well the new problem: the solution is applied to the problem (which is actually not a new one), i.e. knowledge is reused (reuse phase). O retrieved partially fits the new problem: the solution proposed by O retrieved can not be applied as is, but it could help user define the solution for the new problem: a new case is created and stored, i.e. the knowledge base is enlarged. Finally O retrieved is so different from O target that it does not provide any help. In this latter situation, the existing knowledge is not enough to face the new problem. Revise phase consists of verifying that the solution is effective. Finally, the case is catalogued in the case base (Retain phase). If new attribute values are introduced with the new case, the similarity table must be properly updated. The next section will discuss an example of the retrieve and reuse phase.
An Example
Let's consider the following problem: how to mitigate the risk that passwords used to authenticate for restricted services are captured by other users or lost. The problem is formalised in table 2. For comprehension' sake, let's assume that there are four candidate cases into the case base, namely the misuse cases #524, #530, #557, and #541. In order to understand how the system works, let's consider two different similarity functions, f 1 and f 2 . The example will show how similarity functions could affect the retrieval results. Each similarity function consists of a similarity table for each attribute used to define the problem. For space's reasons, only parts of the two functions are showed, in table 7. Some values in the similarity function f 1 are intentionally set wrong, in order to emphasize the effects in the retrieve phase. For instance, in the Related Business Rule attribute of f 2 , similarity between the tag Available over the internet with itself corresponds to 0.1, while it should reasonably be 1.0. The fitness mean is a parameter for evaluating the quality of comparison. The higher this parameter is the better is the evaluation of the retrieved case. As a matter of fact, for both the functions, the values obtained by setting the parameter at 1.00 are higher than when the parameter is 0.05. Let's analyze now the results of the retrieve phase. In both the cases the misuse case #524 (see table 4) scored the maximum, which is 100. This case is perfectly correspondent to the problem description, i.e. the case will be reused as is, indeed. The #524 summary quotes: A crook obtains passwords for user accounts belonging to someone else, for the e-shop application typically e-shop clerks or system administrators. In order to get the complete picture of the differences, let's compare the misuse case #530 which is considered the worst one for f 2 , with #541, that is the worst one for f 1 (see table 6 ).
The #541 regards disclosing the agreement about the date of the meeting to other people who are not authorized. The #530 describes the case when the misuser gains access to the system by trying large sets of passwords. Accordingly to f 1 's results, #530 is much more suitable than #541. This evaluation is not satisfactory, as #530 description misses two attributes' value, i.e. the problem is much more general than the problem we need to solve, and consequently the solution, too. In conclusion the results provided by f 2 are more realistic, as both #530 and #541 have a close similarity, while the similarity with the O target is definitely low. Let's analyse briefly the points of strength and weakness of the solution presented here. Pros are: it is possible to manage security knowledge without introducing further structures, or tools. As a matter of fact, the system exploits directly misuse cases, that should be integrated in the security engineering process. The main drawbacks are related to the similarity functions. Maintenance is costly, as every change to the similarity tables affects other tables. Furthermore, if the similarity tables are not properly set up, the retrieval could be scarcely effective.
Related Work
At the best knowledge of the authors the problem of capturing and reusing security knowledge modeled as misuse case has been not faced, with the only exception of [17] . Ingalsbe et al. [8] introduce a process of threat modeling basically aimed at risk mitigation. Modeling the threats is used as a basis for evaluating related risks. This paper copes with the organizational aspects of threat modeling. Some authors [1] highlight the need for interleaving and aligning security engineering and software engineering processes. The paper does not face the problem of collecting knowledge about security risk mitigation. Authors in [14] present a unified threat model for assessing threats in web applications, by extending the threat tree model. They utilize historical statistical information contained in this model to design threat mitigation schemes. The threat assessing results and mitigation schemes should help direct secure coding and testing. In order to solve the problems of evaluating system security threat in the complex system, Liu and Liu [15] introduce a threat model based on the attacking-tree graph. First, an evaluating standard of the feasibility and harmful level of the vulnerability exploitation is given. Then an attacking-tree graph of the target system is constructed based on the relationship among exploitations of vulnerabilities. This model is able to calculate the impact of all kind of threats on the system security. Paper [12] presents an approach for addressing the threat modeling in pervasive computing; the model could also support the risk analysis. To improve trustworthiness of software design, paper [6] presents a formal threat-driven approach, which explores explicit behaviors of security threats as the mediator between security goals and applications of security features. To specify the intended functions, security threats, and threat mitigations of a security design as a whole, authors' method relies on aspect-oriented Petri nets as a unified formalism. All these papers focus on the problem of threat modeling. Paper [10] proposes a threat model-driven security testing approach for detecting undesirable threat behavior at run-time. The threat model guides the code instrumentation; instrumented code is tested while the execution traces are collected and analyzed to verify whether the undesirable threat traces are matched. This paper applies threat modeling for strengthening security testing. 
Conclusions
This paper introduces a system for capturing, sharing and reusing knowledge about mitigating or removing security flaws from a software system. Future directions include: experimenting the approach on a real case base, and improve the mechanisms of searching. With regards to the latter point, we will further investigate how to make more reliable the similarity function. As the comparison's techniques proposed here are somehow preliminary, we will take into account the application of regular expressions, string patterns, and heuristic based techniques. A second concern is about how to col- 
